Greetings from London, Normal service was resumed at The Economist this week, after our summer double issue meant a week without a print version. As is perhaps inevitable at an institution with a 180-year history of appearing in print, digital-only publication causes a certain degree of angst. It is a sort of vicarious FOMO, a fear of some readers missing out. Our “e-week” produced some outstanding journalism and it would be a shame if you had not seen, for example: our profile of Alphabet as its search engine, Google, approaches 25; or our take on what might happen if Germany stopped making cars; our sobering look at dwindling life expectancy in America; not to mention, of course, our coverage of one of the big news stories of that week, Donald Trump’s most recent indictment. Even for those of us who learned our journalism in the steam age, the digital era offers an enormous consolation: our work is still there, and far more easily retrieved than from a dusty pile of dead trees. Looking to the week ahead, tension between America and China will continue to make geopolitical news. That is certainly the backdrop to an historic meeting on Friday, when President Joe Biden will play host at Camp David to the first-ever standalone trilateral summit between America, Japan and South Korea. As if timed to underscore the importance of closer American co-ordination with its East Asian allies, this weekend an old, old row has blown up again, with the brief stopover in New York on his way to a presidential inauguration in Paraguay, of William Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice-president—and probable presidential candidate. Each week seems to produce a new bone of contention between the two superpowers. On August 9th Mr Biden imposed new curbs on American investment in sensitive technologies in China. But his strategy, we argued this week, is not working. America’s efforts to “de-risk” its relations with China are being counter-productive. We continue to report extensively from the war in Ukraine—at least from the Ukrainian side of the front line. No country fighting a war is wholly open to the press, nor wholly innocent of bad behaviour. But at least Ukraine seems to acknowledge that there are rules it should play by. Its treatment of Russian prisoners-of-war has been far from perfect. But there is no doubt that they are far luckier than their Ukrainian counterparts in Russia or Russian-occupied Ukraine, to whom the foreign press has, of course, no access. I would also commend our correspondent’s report from a graveyard in Lviv, where efforts to bury the fallen in the present war are hampered, quite literally, by the skeletons of previous conflicts. The coming week is quite likely to see the latest of Mr Trump’s many indictments, in this case over his alleged interference in the election in Fulton County, Georgia. So the question Tom Nuttall asked from this chair last week remains relevant: will Mr Trump’s legal woes hurt or help his presidential bid, and why? Thanks for the thoughtful responses. Most of you think that Mr Trump’s legal travails will not damage his chances of securing the Republican presidential nomination. As for the general election, views were split. Ben Coombs thinks his legal woes could “magnify existing unfavourable impressions” and make the path to the presidency more challenging, a conclusion endorsed by Jerry Rothstein. Eric Rathner thinks that what happens at the trials themselves makes a difference. A guilty verdict in one of more of them would not sway “true believers”, but it might tip independents into voting for Mr Biden, even as “the lesser of two evils”. And Kris Franks concludes “it’s very likely to be a wash”—his base may be strengthened by the indictments, but fence-sitting voters are likely to shy away. Thanks very much for writing. For Tom’s return next week, perhaps you could tell him whether you agree with our leader this week, that “Joe Biden’s China strategy is not working”, and, if so, tell him what would be a better one. |